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After the temporary and uneasy interlude that followed the Coalition government’s 
moratorium on airport expansion in the South East of England in 2010, the third 
runway at Heathrow airport is firmly back on the political agenda under the May 
government. In October 2016, any lingering doubts about the policy reversal within 
the Conservative Party were put to rest by the public declaration of support to expand 
the London hub airport. Indeed, despite opposition from within the Cabinet and 
amongst senior Conservative MPs, it is tempting to conclude that the ‘wicked issue’ 
of aviation policy is back where it started in the early 2000s, or at least back to the 
dying days of the Brown government, when it belatedly decided to support expansion 
in late 2009. At least for Heathrow airport, the construction of a third runway is 
deemed to be compatible with the delivery of ‘carbon neutral’ growth in flights and 
passenger numbers.1At the same time, ‘have your cake and eat it’ policy narratives 
extolling the virtues of ‘sustainable aviation’ are back stalking the corridors of 
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Westminster, while demands to address aviation’s rising carbon emissions have been 
side-lined by the supposed benefits of international carbon trading mechanisms (this 
time in the shape of CORSIA, which is the highly contested global carbon offsetting 
scheme for air travel that will come into full operation in 2027).  
 
Arguably, following the work of the Airports Commission and the Brexit referendum, 
and at least in some government circles, the issue of aviation policy is now seen 
through a post-sustainable lens; issues of sustainability and climate change are thus 
relativized to other equally pressing goals, such as economic growth and enhanced 
international connectivity. In other words, it inhabits a post-Brexit world in which 
aviation expansion goes hand in glove with aspirations of a global Britain that can 
trade in new and emerging markets. At the same time, the future of Heathrow, 
London’s international hub, is once more bound to the fate of the capital city and the 
rest of the country. In short, although Theresa May was previously a vocal opponent 
of expansion, the resignation of Cameron, the increasing political salience of new 
trading roles and connections for the UK in post-Brexit scenarios, and May’s own 
short-term political need for a ‘strong’ symbolic decision to cement her premiership, 
all came together to re-legitimise the building of the third runway at Heathrow. 
 
Nonetheless, despite this shifting context, opposition to expansion remains. Local 
communities oppose noise and air pollution, whilst environmentalists continue to 
draw attention to rising carbon emissions, climate change, and the limits of global 
emissions trading. Local authorities in and around London are preparing to come 
together to oppose expansion. The same is true for local residents and communities, 
more of whom risk being affected by increasing levels of noise, deteriorating air 
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quality, and greater congestion, not to mention concerns about the destruction of 
property and adequate compensation.2 Of course, the government has sought to 
resolve the problem of noise and rebuild trust in the wake of accusations that 
successive governments have broken their promises about Heathrow expansion. In 
particular, it has put forward plans for an Independent Commission on Civil Aviation 
Noise (ICCAN), as well as a revamped consultative committee at Heathrow – 
Heathrow Community Engagement Board (HCEB). The latter is expected to be given 
greater powers and has already been endowed with a more high-profile leader in the 
person of Rachel Cerfontyne, former deputy chair of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission.3  
 
Yet the stark fact remains that a growing list of British governments has been unable 
to engineer a partial or temporary policy settlement in aviation. Indeed, there has been 
no new runway in the South East for over 70 years. So the question still remains: will 
the government get their expansion proposals to stick this time? This introduction 
offers an initial characterisation of the shifting political and policy contexts of UK 
aviation. We also set out the thematic concerns and conceptual architecture that are 
employed in the three papers collected together in this special collection on the 
Airports Commission and airport expansion and management. We begin with a brief 
conceptualization of aviation as a ‘wicked policy issue’.  
 
AVIATION AS A WICKED POLICY ISSUE 
 
It has become commonplace to characterize contemporary policy controversies as 
‘wicked policy issues’, which are ‘immune’ to traditional ‘cures’ or the ‘messy 
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solutions’ of often contradictory policy instruments. Of course, it is often suggested 
that all policy issues are in some ways ‘intractable’ or ‘stubborn’, all too readily 
shoved in the ‘too difficult box’.4 After all, the work of politics is mostly devoted to 
the generation of pragmatic, second-best solutions that might improve the plight of 
some of the people some of the time.5 Putting such realities to one side for a moment, 
we begin by conceptualizing aviation as a wicked policy issue, thus foregrounding the 
fundamental challenges facing any British government in reaching a temporary 
settlement in the domain of airport expansion.  
 
In the first place, drawing upon the seminal definition of wicked issues by Rittel and 
Webber, the cluster of problems posed by flying can neither be readily formulated nor 
easily agreed upon.6 In the 1960s, the question of aviation was mainly linked to issues 
about conservation and the quality of life of those directly affected by its rapid 
growth, while in the 2000s increasing concerns about its impacts on climate change, 
social justice and global inequalities were added to the list. One consequence of these 
developments is that it has become increasingly difficult to constrain aviation policy 
to its traditional domain of connectivity, economic growth and social progress. At the 
same time, the underlying assumptions of the ‘predict and provide’ model, whereby 
growing passenger numbers were taken as a sign of progress, so that the central task 
of any government was to provide sufficient capacity for aviation expansion, no 
longer holds (if it ever did). Forecasting for growth - or starting from the premise of 
expansion - only gets a partial grip on the slippery problem that is now aviation. In 
short, as the domain of aviation policy has become more complex, and as its 
boundaries become more blurred, so too has the capacity of policymakers to tame the 
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unpredictable interdependencies between air travel and other social and political 
practices.  
 
The upshot of aviation as a wicked policy problem is that it has given birth to rival 
constructions of the problem, including airport capacity, aviation noise, air pollution, 
climate change, uneven economic and regional development, airspace management, 
social mobility, or global connectivity. By their very nature, such issues spill over into 
rival arenas, exposing complicated and unpredictable patterns of interdependency. For 
example, tackling aircraft noise will at some point impact upon efforts to reduce 
carbon emissions levels, while developing new hybrid or electric planes to offset 
carbon emissions will potentially increase noise as new structures are added to planes 
to reduce approach speeds. Aviation planning and expansion at Heathrow are also 
intertwined with the spatial management of economic infrastructure in the South-East 
of England and the dilemmas of uneven economic development across the UK. 
Equally, the practice of regulating aviation has, in the words of Rittel and Webber, 
‘no stopping rule’. Practices and outcomes of noise management, environmental 
efficiency, air quality, or airspace navigation can always be improved, while other 
dimensions of the problems suddenly come to light, so there is never a completely 
optimal solution and unforeseen consequences abound.  
 
FRAMING MATTERS: BRACKETING OUT ISSUES  
 
Within this thicket of disputed problems and solutions, different policy frames or 
ways of seeing aviation matter. Indeed, different ways of viewing the ‘problem-
solution’ dynamic in aviation are intrinsically tied to competing frames or narratives 
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of air travel; in recent years these are typified by policy dichotomies that pit economic 
growth and expanding connectivity, on the one hand, against protecting the 
environment and ensuring a good quality of life for those directly and indirectly 
affected on the other. Each frame pictures the issue differently, while bringing 
forward its own particular forms of expertise, models and languages. This is not 
simply a disagreement over the ‘facts of aviation - for example, the decibel level at 
which aviation noise becomes a nuisance or what levels of mitigation are appropriate 
to compensate airport communities – as rival frames construct or bring into being 
different images, values and norms. Different actors or groups thus come to 
‘understand’ aviation differently, often ‘seeing’ the practices of air travel through 
incommensurate values or lenses. The result is that policy becomes trapped in a series 
of stalemates, as different actors ‘often argue past each other, disagreeing even over 
what comprise the “facts” of the situation’.7  
 
As the articles gathered together in this collection demonstrate, narratives of aviation 
success have been long embedded in the British state. The rhetoric of the Airports 
Commission is a good example of this. The opening statement of the executive 
summary of its final report reiterated the claim that ‘the position of the UK within the 
global aviation market is critical to its economy’. Advancing arguments to support 
‘the case for change’, the final report reactivated and repeated deeply sedimented 
claims about the importance of leisure flights and connectivity to the productivity and 
growth of the British economy; the need for hub capacity to ensure improved long-
haul routes to emerging markets; fears over the falling competitiveness of London as 
a global city; the pressures on airport capacity in the South East; and the impact of 
capacity constraints on fares and the rise of international competitors.8  
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Set against these economic benefits, the failure of government to act to address 
capacity constraint would, in the eyes of the Commission, be ‘short-sighted and 
perilous’.9 The Commission thus repeated the rhetoric of economic risk and 
overloaded airport capacity, which is inscribed in countless white papers, ministerial 
statements and policy briefings. Indeed, it invoked the fear of economic decline and 
reduced mobility, which has hung like the Sword of Damocles over the heads of the 
British public throughout the post-war regime of aviation expansion. The latter had 
been predicated on a utilitarian logic of ‘predict and provide’, paying little attention to 
the overall pattern of expansion or wider environmental concerns.10 
 
Empirical evidence suggests that once actors invest in a particular frame, it tends to 
‘stick’, thus serving to constantly re-construct their interactions and dialogues with 
others. Over time, the function of each policy frame is to bracket out different 
dimensions of the wicked issue of aviation expansion. Indeed, frames are inherently 
political, as they exclude particular discourses and arguments, while foregrounding 
others. In fact, the very existence of a rival frame is one of the conditions for a 
frame’s existence: what organizes and sustains one group of actors’ investments in a 
way of seeing is the opposition of a rival frame.  
 
FRAGMENTED GOVERNANCE AND THE ABSENCE OF GATEKEEPERS 
 
It is not surprising that the ongoing antagonisms and disputes in the field of aviation 
policy are reflected in their governance, which is increasingly pluralized, 
heterogeneous and entangled. Such fragmentation has been exacerbated by the logics 
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of liberalization and privatization that have shaped the aviation industry in the last 
thirty or so years, leading to the emergence of airport companies and a proliferation of 
new and different types of airlines. Such logics have been amplified by the integration 
of aviation into the European Union (and perhaps even its decoupling) in a field 
which has been highly internationalized. This has been the case ever since the signing 
of the Chicago Convention in 1944, which established the International Civil Aviation 
Organisation (ICAO), where the latter is the specialized organization of the United 
Nations that was given the task of coordinating the global regulation of international 
air travel.  
 
Yet, even domestically, it is difficult to navigate the interlocking pattern of policy 
remits and confused lines of responsibility that characterize aviation policymaking. 
Even an issue like the management of aviation noise cannot escape the ‘thorny’ issue 
of boundary and jurisdictional disputes between different (and at times contending) 
parts and levels of government, not least the Civil Aviation Authority, the Department 
for Transport and, indeed, the individual airports themselves. Such confused 
responsibilities often serve to fuel ‘blame game’ strategies, in which politicians, 
ministries, public agencies and indeed companies seek to re-assign appropriate 
responsibilities, jurisdictions, functions and competences on to rival actors.  
 
 
This governance patchwork has repeatedly begged questions about the overall 
political leadership and direction of aviation policy. In the early 2000s, these 
criticisms were in many ways answered by New Labour in its attempts to create a 
national dialogue on aviation. It engaged multiple stakeholders in a consultation 
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designed to generate a policy settlement that would set out plans for aviation 
expansion for thirty years. This effort to bring about a form of collaborative 
policymaking targeted the piecemeal and fragmented decision-making over individual 
airports, which had allegedly hampered aviation expansion in the 1980s and 1990s. In 
practice, it merely amplified the conflicts and antagonisms over airport expansion, 
paving the way for the Coalition’s moratorium on aviation expansion in the South-
East. Yet Cameron’s commitment to oppose expansion was only a precarious 
interlude, as supporters of supporters of expansion, who vociferously advocated the 
need for the UK to maintain a global hub airport, which would connect the UK to 
emergent markets, pursued an intense media-driven campaign to put expansion back 
on the agenda. Political leadership was once again seen to be caught between 
competing coalitions and rival demands. The upshot was that in the summer of 2012 
the solution that emerged was to try and remove aviation from the political domain by 
transferring responsibility to the depoliticised arena of expert governance in the form 
of the Airports Commission. Demands for political direction had paradoxically led the 
government to absolve itself of responsibility. 
 
 
DEPOLITICISATION: YOU CAN’T GET RID OF POLITICS 
 
Vigorous debate about the concept of depoliticization – that is, endeavours to remove 
the sting of politics from a particular issue or practice through various means – has 
emerged in recent discussions of statecraft, governance and policy-making.11 As we 
note above, the notion has also been used by actors engaged in the current endeavours 
to reach an acceptable settlement about UK aviation. Indeed, the government’s turn to 
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the Airports commission – an expert committee that would have the time and space to 
reach a considered conclusion – can be seen as an explicit attempt to remove the issue 
from the hurly-burly of partisan politics, so that a more technocratic and reason-based 
solution could be reached. Yet, in dealing with wicked policy issues, it is often 
difficult, if not impossible, to circumvent the problem and thus reach a rational and 
acceptable answer. Depoliticization (by definition) presupposes prior and concurrent 
processes of politicization, and strategies of depoliticization can often re-politicize the 
issues that are addressed. Logics of depoliticization are thus at best often only 
temporary solutions to a dilemma or at worst displacements of problems.  
 
Seen in this light, the Airports Commission promised to take the politics out of 
aviation policy. As it was widely noted in September 2012, when the Commission 
was established, the Cameron government had decided to delegate to its ‘independent’ 
commissioners, led by Sir Howard Davies, the task of delivering a workable and 
binding evidence-driven settlement, which could guide airports policy for the next 20 
or 30 years. Of particular concern in this regard was the desire to tackle the problem 
of noise. The Commission thus reiterated its support, first voiced in its 2013 interim 
report, for an independent aviation noise authority to ‘act as an impartial source of 
expertise and advice’. And it supplemented this appeal to use impartial and 
independent expertise, which could function above and beyond the realm of politics, 
with a proposal to create a Community Engagement Board. Based on existing 
arrangements at Frankfurt and Schiphol airports, which had earlier been advocated by 
the Civil Aviation Authority12, this board would act as a ‘trusted repository of 
information’. It is plausible to argue that this proposal was part of a broader strategy 
to reframe community opposition to aviation noise, not in terms of concrete demands 
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against the impact of noise on quality of life, but as a problem about the lack of trust 
in public decision-making. Indeed, in seeking to move such issues out of the political 
domain, the Commission voiced its continued concerns that the existing arrangements 
for airspace changes left final decisions with the Secretary of State; it thus exposed 
them to the risk of ‘being politicised’, which could in turn ‘risk delay or, at the 
extreme, failure’.13  
 
However, as the papers in this volume suggest, the much sought after depoliticisation 
of the issue has not been accomplished. At the same time, the government’s and the 
Commission’s technocratic strategy of allowing impartial experts to intervene and 
settle the problem has been found wanting. The Conservative government welcomed 
the publication of the final report of the Airports Commission in July 2015. Expansion 
at Heathrow was to be accompanied by a package of mitigation measures including a 
ban on night flights; a legally-binding noise envelope; and the creation of an 
independent aviation noise authority and community engagement board. Importantly, 
expansion at the London hub was made dependent on being able to meet European 
Union (EU) air quality limits, whilst a fourth runway was ruled out once and for all. 
Yet, almost six months after the publication of the Airport Commission’s final report, 
the Cameron government, whilst reaffirming its support for a new runway in the 
South-East, announced that it had yet to decide its preferred scheme for additional 
capacity. Paradoxically, after two years of investigations by the Commission, it called 
for further evidence and analysis of the environmental impacts of expansion on air 
quality. Now arguing that the decision had to be ‘right’, the Secretary of State for 
Transport pushed back any decision until the summer of 2016; arguably the time of 
the Airports Commission had been and gone.  
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CONCLUSIONS: WILL HEATHROW EXPANSION GET OFF THE 
GROUND THIS TIME? 
 
It is axiomatic that the task of tackling the ‘wicked issue’ of airport expansion was 
never going to be straightforward for UK governments. Howard Davies himself 
recounts how he and his fellow commissioners had received ‘more commiserations 
than congratulations’ when appointed to the Airports Commission, noting that 
commentators were keen to describe the Commission as the ‘latest in a long series of 
so far largely fruitless attempts to grapple with the problem of airport capacity in a 
densely populated island.’14 So, after over two years of investigation by the 
Commission, and after nearly three further years of deliberating and weighing-up of 
its findings by government, how much further along the runway are we in addressing 
this ‘wicked issue’ of aviation expansion?  
 
Following a revised draft of the National Airports Aviation Strategy in October 2017, 
and then a report of the transport select committee in March 2018, the key focus of 
the current phase of UK aviation policy is the publication of the final NPS. In certain 
respects, therefore, we are back where we started in 2003. However, the focus of 
discussion has been narrowed (more or less) to the case for Heathrow expansion, and 
the conditions that should be satisfied if a third runway is given the green light, even 
if Gatwick is still theoretically on the map.  
 
Of course, politics is always in flux and fraught with unpredictable events. Yet there 
are some general lessons that we can learn from the experience of the Airports 
Commission and the cycle of policymaking that has unfolded since the 2010 
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moratorium. The three articles in this collection examine how we got here and what 
are the likely outcomes of the current ‘resolution’ to the wicked issue of aviation 
policy. This collection of papers also casts further light on this episode of ‘stalled’ 
policymaking and the failure of successive governments to engineer a partial or 
temporary settlement in aviation policy. In this introduction, we have provided an 
initial contextualisation and characterisation of the final report of the Davies 
Commission, clarifying its logic and its attempt to bring about a settlement. This 
analysis is then extended in the first paper of the collection by Griggs and Howarth. 
The other two papers deepen the contextualization of the Heathrow case in two 
directions. Tim Marshall provides a vital context for understanding and evaluating the 
Heathrow case by exploring the changing character and form of the planning process 
in the UK. Rob Freestone and Doug Baker extend this contextualization and analysis 
by situating the dilemmas of the Heathrow case, especially the problem of noise for 
those residents surrounding the hub airport, in relation to the differences and 
similarities of the debate about noise at Sydney airport in Australia. This context is 
particularly relevant, because the Sydney model (as well as Paris) has been discussed 
as a potential way of dealing with the problem of noise at Heathrow. 
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